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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee
CaseNo.20100563-CA

v.
CHRISTOPHER DUANE ELLIS
Defendant/Appellant

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ARGUMENT
I.

The cases raised in the State's brief do not justify Officer Moore's removal of
the entire contents of Ellis' pockets.
The State argues that Officer Moore was justified in removing all of the contents

of Ellis's pockets out of concern for his safety. See Br. of Appellee at 13-21. In support
of this argument, the State raises four cases not addressed in Ellis' brief Only one of
these cases was published and is citable as precedent. All four cases, including the only
one with precedential value, are distinguishable from the present case.
The first of the new cases raised by the State is the unpublished Haynes v. State,
2008 WL 1759086 (Alaska App.).1 In Haynes, the Alaska Court of Appeals decided that
an officer was justified in removing the entire contents of the defendant's pocket because
1

Haynes is an unpublished memorandum opinion carrying, at the direction of the Alaska
Court of Appeals, the following notice: "Memorandum decisions of this court do not
create legal precedent. . . . Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as
binding authority for any proposition of law." 2008 WL 1759086. Contrary to the
State's assertion, Haynes is not dispositive in this case. Br. Of Appellee at 15.
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the officer could not determine whether the pocket contained a weapon. Id. at * 1. The
key difference between Haynes and the present case is that in Haynes, the officer
conducted the search in the course of serving two arrest warrants on the defendant. Id.
Although the court characterized the search as a pat down for weapons, it should have
characterized the search as a search incident to a lawful arrest. See Id.
A search incident to arrest clearly justifies searching the entire contents of
defendant's pockets. See e.g. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 64, 70 S.Ct. 430,
94 L.Ed. 653 (1950), overruled in part by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct.
2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (valid search incident to lawful arrest extends to the areas
within the arrestee's "immediate control"). In the present case, Ellis was not under arrest
at the time of the search, but was only subject to an investigatory stop. Any search and
seizure in the course of an investigatory stop is strictly limited by Terry and its progeny
to those items which a reasonable person would suspect to be dangerous weapons. See
e.g. State v. Fowler, 883 P.2d 338, 340 (Wash. App. 1994); see also State v. Baker, 2010
UT 18, \ 41, 229 P.3d 650 ("The only permissible objective of the...frisk is the discovery
of weapons that may be used against the officer or others") (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
The State also cites Stated. Heitzmann, 632 N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 2001). The State's
reliance on this case is misplaced. Contrary to the State's assertion, the Heitzmann court
did not conclude that an officer's removal of non-weapons from the defendant's pockets
was reasonable simply because he was unable to tell what the contents consisted of.
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Rather, the Heitzmann court held that the officer acted reasonably in asking the
defendant to remove the contents of his own pockets because, in addition to the
unidentified bulges in defendant's pockets, the officer knew that there was a gun in the
vehicle in which defendant was a passenger, the officer had been advised that the
defendant had recently received a shipment of methamphetamine, the defendant was
becoming progressively more nervous, and another deputy had advised the officer to be
"cautious" with the defendant because the defendant had become agitated during a prior
search. Id. at 8.
When the defendant in Hetizmann refused to comply with the officer's orders to
empty his pockets, the officer himself removed the defendant's wallet and a wad of
money, items he knew not to be weapons, from defendant's pockets because, similar to
Officer Moore's justification in the present case, "the wallet could have contained razor
blades and the wad of money could have contained needles." Id. at 9. Also similar to
Officer Moore's justification in the present case, the officer in Heitzmann removed these
items to make sure that the defendant didn't have anything else in his pocket. Id.
However, the Heitzmann court held that the additional intrusion was justified only by
"extenuating circumstances" related to the defendcint's attempts to prevent the officer
from performing an effective pat-down. Id. at 10.
Specifically, the defendant "made quick evasive movements as though he was
going to run around the front of the truck." Id. at 8. The defendant's sudden movements
required the officer to "hang[] onto [the defendant's] right arm" as he conducted the frisk.
Id. at 9. The defendant then "pulled his arm out of the jacket, necessitating that the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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officer hold him by the back of his pants." Id. The court held that this threatening
conduct by the defendant entitled the officer to make an immediate intrusive search of the
suspect. Id.

*

The Heitzmann holding is limited to the circumstances of that case. The
Heitzmann court held that "[ujnder the circumstances of this case, we believe the
officer's actions were a proportionate response to [the defendant's] actions. . . . We
conclude that the officer's removal of [the contents of the defendant's] pockets was
reasonable under these extenuating circumstances."

Id. at 10 (emphasis added).

Noticeably absent from the present case are any such extenuating circumstances. Ellis
was at all times cooperative and docile. Ellis complied with all requests from Officer
Moore and made no attempts to evade him. Heitzmann is inapplicable to this case.
The State seeks to distinguish this case from Fowler, 883 P.2d 338, on the basis of
the unpublished cases State v. Rubio, 2007 WL 2085348 (Wash. App. Div.l), and State v.
Barboza, 2010 WL 4514196 (Wash. App. Div.2).2 However, Rubio and Barboza are not
analogous to the case at hand.
In Rubio, the officer was in the process of removing a potential weapon from the
defendant's pocket. 2007 WL 2085348 at *1. Before the officer put his hand in the
defendant's pocket, he asked the defendant "what was in the pocket." Id. The officer put

2

To clarify, Rubio and Barbozame not published in the Washington Appellate Reports.
The pages indicated in the initial citations to Rubio and Barboza given in the State's
brief, namely 139 Wash.App. 1069 and 158 Wash.App. 1034 respectively, only report
that an unpublished decision was reached in the case.
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his hand in the pocket and felt a plastic baggie. Id. At the same moment, the defendant
"responded, 'It's only for personal use.'" Id.
The unpublished Rubio decision held that "Where police, during the course of a
protective search for weapons, happen across some other item that is 'immediately
recognizable' as incriminating, the item may be seized." Id. at *2. The court found that
the defendant's statement "It's only for personal use," rendered the plastic baggie
immediately recognizable as contraband. Id. The basis of the court's holding was the
immediately recognizable incriminating character of the baggie, and was not, as indicated
by the State, that the officer could not reasonably be expected to remove only suspected
weapons. In the present case, however, Officer Moore did not immediately recognize
any of the items seized from Ellis as incriminating before they were removed from Ellis'
pocket. Rubio is thus inapplicable to the present case.
Barboza is also inapplicable. In Barboza, the officer felt a hard object in the
defendant's pocket which could have been a weapon, but he "was unable to tell that there
was anything inside [the defendant's] pocket other than the hard object. [The officer]
testified that he did not intend to remove anything other than the hard object in [the
defendant's] pocket." 2010 WL 4514196 at *2. The officer in Barboza, reaching for a
possible weapon, inadvertently removed other items from the defendant's pocket, which
the officer did not even know existed at the time of the search. Id. at *3 n. 3.
The search in Barboza is a far cry from Officer Moore's search of Ellis. Officer
Moore intentionally removed everything from Ellis's pockets to lay it out in the open.
Barboza reaffirmed the central holding of Fowler, the principle most applicable to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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present case, that "during the course of a protective frisk, the police may not intentionally
seize items they know are not weapons." Id. Officer Moore knew that many of the items
seized from Ellis's pockets were not weapons.

There was no justification for

indiscriminately extracting those items which a reasonable person would not believe
could have been weapons. .
When conducting a Terry frisk, officers are limited to seizing those items
reasonably believed to be weapons.

The cases raised by the State do not indicate

otherwise. By intentionally seizing items he did not reasonably believe to be weapons,
Officer Moore exceeded the scope of a lawful Terry frisk. Items discovered as a direct
result of such an unlawful seizure should have been suppressed by the trial court.
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Ellis asks that this Court reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress,
and remand this matter to the Fourth District Court with instructions that the evidence is
to be suppressed and that Ellis's plea may be withdrawn.
DATED this ^

day of September, 2011.

MARCrARET P. LINDSAY
MATTHEW R. MORRISE
Counsel for Appellant
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